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RECENT DECISIONS 
ANTITRUST LAW-SUGGESTED RESALE PRICE POLICY-LIMITATIONS OF USE 
OF THE COLGATE DOCTRINE-The United States Government brought a civil 
action charging that Parke, Davis & Co., a large pharmaceutical manufac-
turer, violated sections 1 and 3 of the Sherman Act1 by combining and con-
spiring with wholesalers and/or retailers to maintain the resale price of its 
products. Parke Davis, in marketing its products through both wholesale 
and retail channels of distribution, announced in its catalogues a suggested 
policy of resale prices at the wholesale and retail levels. In an effort to 
promote adherence to this policy, Parke Davis representatives visited whole-
salers and retailers separately in non-fair trade areas.2 The wholesalers 
were informed that Parke Davis would refuse them further sales if they, 
in turn, resold to retailers who cut prices or if they themselves cut prices. 
Emphasizing the same policy to retailers the representatives indicated that 
other Parke Davis retailers had been contacted. Despite these visits, some 
retailers continued to advertise and sell Parke Davis products below the 
suggested prices. As a result Parke Davis and the wholesalers refused to sell 
to these retailers. But advertising below the suggested prices continued. 
Additional visits were made to retailers in an attempt to control their 
pricing activities. These further visits having failed, Parke Davis aban-
doned all methods of promoting adherence to its policy. The district court 
dismissed the complaint after the government submitted its evidence.3 On 
appeal, held, reversed and remanded, one justice concurring,4 three justices 
dissenting:5 Parke Davis' suggested resale price policy created a combina-
tion or conspiracy in two different ways: first, through discussions with 
retailers to promote adherence to its announced policy, and second, by 
announcing a policy which involved the use of wholesalers to aid Parke 
Davis in the implementation of its policy applicable to retailers. United 
States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).6 
Since the inception of federal antitrust laws there has been a need for 
accommodating the government's interest in prohibiting commercial price 
126 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended by 50 Stat. 693 (1'937) (commonly referred to as the 
Miller-Tydings Amendment), 15 U.S.C. (1958) §§1, 3 and 4. 
2 The 1937 Miller-Tydings Amendment to §1 of the Sherman Act, note I supra, 
validated specified types of minimum resale price maintenance agreements, provided that 
the commodities affected are resold in a state where the transaction is legal. However, this 
statute is inapplicable here because there was no Fair Trade Law in the District of 
Columbia or the State of Virginia when the violation was alleged to have occurred. 
3 United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., (D.C. D.C. 1958) 164 F. Supp. 827. See notes, 45 
VA. L. R.Ev. 119 (1959) and 27 GEO. WASH. L. R.Ev. 260 (1958). 
4 Justice Stewart concurred in the judgment and found "no occasion to question, even 
by innuendo, the continuing validity of the Colgate decision." Principal case at 49. 
5 Justices Harlan, Frankfurter and Whittaker dissented, indicating that they thought 
the effect of the Court's decision was to "send to its demise" the long standing precedent 
of the Colgate doctrine. Principal case at 49. 
6 Parke Davis' officers were acquitted in a separate criminal proceeding, because the 
government failed to prove a conspiracy. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., (D.C. D.C. 
1958) 1958 CCH Trade Cas. iJ69,079. 
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fixing7 to the entrepreneur's right to select the customers with which it will 
deal.8 The broad doctrine that a seller may unilaterally institute and admin-
ister a suggested price policy by dealing only with those customers who 
elect not to cut the seller's suggested prices was established in the landmark 
decision of United States v. Colgate & Co.9 The Colgate doctrine as legally 
permissible economic behavior of a seller has been constantly reiterated; 
but the methods employed to effectuate a suggested resale price program 
through refusals to deal have been an area of major dispute since Colgate 
was handed down in 1919.1 0 Even prior to Colgate it was settled that 
agreements, combinations or conspiracies to maintain prices were in vio-
lation of section I of the Sherman Act.11 Subsequent to Colgate, the 
Supreme Court began scrutinizing the methods by which a seller effec-
tuated its program of selecting customers, when intimately tied to sug-
gested resale price maintenance, with an eye to the prohibitions found in 
section I of the Sherman Act. As early as 1922 the Court ruled, in FTC v. 
Beech-Nut,12 that it was unlawful for a manufacturer to secure the "co-
operation" of any parties outside of its own enterprise for the purpose of 
obtaining information that would enable it effectively to carry out its 
policies of refusing to deal with customers who cut its suggested resale 
prices. The Beech-Nut doctrine, in effect, has acted as a counter-balance 
that has been used to preserve the policy of the Sherman Act against tacit 
agreements or conspiracies to fix prices by the selection of customers route. 
Although it has severely restricted the means by which one can effec-
tively use the Colgate doctrine, Beech-Nut was not intended to limit the 
underlying theory that one may unilaterally refuse to deal with anyone 
else, even if the economic result is the maintenance of prices. The principal 
7 See, e.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927); United States 
v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil 
Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). 
s See, e.g., United States v. Colgate &: Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919); Great Atlantic & Pacific 
Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat, (2d Cir. 1915) 227 F. 46. 
9 250 U.S. 300 (1919). See, generally, on individual refusals to deal, comments, 56 MICH. 
L. REv. 426 (1958); 36 Troe. L. REv. 799 (1958); Barber, "Refusals To Deal Under 
the Federal Antitrust Laws," 103 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 847 (1955); comment, 58 YALE L.J. 
1121 (1949). 
10 See, e.g., Shakespeare Co. v. FTC, (6th Cir. 1931) 50 F. (2d) 758 (unlawful actively 
to solicit assurance from the dealer that price cutting will be discontinued as a condition 
to filling future orders); J. W. Kobi Co. v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1927) 23 F. (2d) 41 (unlawful 
to inform dealers that reported price cutters have been refused sales); Hills Bros. v. FTC, 
(9th Cir. 1926) 9 F. (2d) 481 (unlawful to visit price cutting retailers who have been 
reported in an effort to obtain a promise to restore the suggested resale price); Q.R.S. 
Music Co. v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1926) 12 F. (2d) 730 (unlawful to request dealers to report 
price-cutting competitors and act on reports so obtained). 
llDr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911) (agreements between 
manufacturer and its wholesale and retail dealers). Cf. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & 
Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951) (horizontal agreement between manufacturers). 
12 257 U.S. 441 (1922). The finding of "co-operative methods" was based on the prac-
tice of reporting the names of price cutters by retailers, the soliciting of this information 
by the manufacturer's salesmen, the use of code numbers to aid in detecting price cutters, 
and the recording of price cutters on "do-not-sell" lists discussed in Dunn, "Resale Price 
Maintenance," 32 YALE L.J. 676 at 696 (1923). 
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case assumes a role of major importance in defining the limitations gov-
erning the effective use of the Colgate doctrine, distinguishing practices 
within the prohibited and gray areas1 3 delineated in Colgate and Beech-
Nut.14 First, the factual evidence of the repeated discussions benveen Parke 
Davis representatives and dealers, in an effort to secure adherence to the 
pricing program, disclosed practices within the prohibitions of the Beech-
Nut case, despite the contrary holding of the trial court.15 Second, and 
of paramount importance, is the Court's proscription of Parke Davis' pur-
ported extension of its refusal to deal with wholesalers who in tum sold 
Parke Davis products to price-cutting retailers. Such conduct involves use 
by the seller of cooperation of his wholesalers as leverage in effectuating the 
suggested resale price policy on the retail level and the Court was correct 
in concluding that this supplied the element of combination beyond the 
permissible limits of Colgate. The Court expressly recognized that a seller 
may announce a suggested resale price policy at both the wholesale and 
retail levels and refuse to deal with either wholesalers or retailers who do 
not choose to observe the policy, provided the policy on one of these levels 
is not used as an instrumentality for achieving the policy on the other level. 
In the Court's words, Parke Davis' entire policy was tainted with the "vice 
of illegality" when it used its policy "as the vehicle to gain the wholesalers' 
participation in the program to effectuate the retailers' adherence to the 
suggested retail prices."16 This hardly throws "the Colgate doctrine into 
discard," as the dissenting opinion states.17 It merely serves notice that a 
seller who uses Colgate on both the wholesale and retail levels must exer-
cise extreme caution in administering this policy separately on each of those 
levels in order to avoid the illegal element of the Beech-Nut type of factual 
situation. 
While Colgate requires a seller to tread only the narrow path marked out 
by that doctrine, there is still much vitality left in it. The dissent's vigorous 
denunciation of the majority holding and rationale may well serve to alarm 
and deter business firms from embarking upon or continuing a suggested 
resale price policy to a greater extent than is justified by the majority 
holding itself. Certainly the Court has left the door open to effective use 
of Colgate if a seller carefully plans his program in good faith within the 
13 Since the boundary line between Colgate and Beech-Nut is rather tenuous, it has 
been suggested that Colgate be overruled. See, particularly, comments by Judge Jerome 
Frank in Adams-Mitchell Co. v. Cambridge Distributing Co., (2d Cir. 1950) 189 F. (2d) 
913 at 924. 
14 It should be noted that this case does not present a proper factual situation to 
question the validity of the Colgate theory, because there was no well designed effort made 
by Parke Davis to act unilaterally. 
15 The majority of the Court did not rule that the findings of fact of the trial court 
were clearly erroneous. Instead, they found that the trial court had applied an improper 
legal standard in searching the record for evidence of a Sherman Act violation, and 
therefore the record reveals error as a matter of law. However, it should be recognized 
that this is not readily apparent from the trial court's findings, but rather appears to be 
a means used by the Court to achieve a broad scope of review so as to reach a desired result. 
16 Principal case at 46. 
17ld.at57. 
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confines of Colgate.is It would be unfortunate if this decision is erroneously 
interpreted as limiting Colgate to manufacturers selling direct to retailers. 
There appears to be nothing in the Court's majority opinion that adds 
more fuel to marketing developments which have increasingly rendered 
more difficult the status and performance of the functions of the independ-
ent wholesaler in the current distribution pattern of our economy. 
Stanley Zax 
18 See 15 A.B.A. SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW 37 at 51 (1959), where Professor Oppen-
heim suggests that Colgate can be translated into a practical marketing program, presup-
posing the utmost good faith on the part of the manufacturer. This would require (1) a 
written announcement of the suggested prices to the trade, (2) written instructions to the 
sellers' internal organization explaining the meaning of Colgate, and (3) procedures 
disclaiming the authority of the seller's representatives to modify the suggested resale 
price policy and providing that all decisions regarding selection or cutting off customers 
will be made solely by the seller's home office. 
It is also significant that the majority of the Court in Parke Davis saw no element of 
conspiracy or combination in "general voluntary acquiescence" of a seller's customers in 
the seller's suggested resale prices. Professor Oppenheim characterized as "grasping at 
straws" any contention that "Colgate's suggested resale price policy exemption should be 
considered applicable only if a few customers acquiesce in it, or if the seller exercises his 
right to discontinue selling to customers who do not so acquiesce only in isolated instances." 
Id. at 53. 
